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We find that the generally accepted security criteria are flawed for a whole class of protocols for
quantum cryptography. This is so because a standard assumption of the security analysis, namely
that the so-called square-root measurement is optimal for eavesdropping purposes, is not true in
general. There are rather large parameter regimes in which the optimal measurement extracts
substantially more information than the square-root measurement.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
All practical implementations of protocols for quantum
cryptography have to deal with the unavoidable noise in
the transmission lines, and possibly the intervention of an
eavesdropper, that degrade the correlations in the raw-
key data of the communicating parties — Alice and Bob.
They then face a double task: First, they must establish
how much Eve, the evildoing eavesdropper, can possibly
know about their data; and second, they must extract
a secure noise-free key sequence from the insecure noisy
raw data.
The second task of key generation is solved by ex-
ploiting the findings and methods of classical informa-
tion theory, in particular the lesson of the seminal work
by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [1]. They demonstrated that Al-
ice and Bob can always generate a secure key, provided
that the mutual information between them exceeds the
mutual information between either one of them and Eve.
The first task of determining how much Eve knows thus
amounts to figuring out the maximally attainable mutual
information between her and either Alice or Bob. There
are two different, but equivalent, lines of reasoning that
one can choose to follow, depending on how one pictures
the communication between Alice and Bob, and Eve’s
tampering with it.
One scenario is that of the 1984 protocol by Bennett
and Brassard (BB84, [2]), in which Alice sends quantum-
information carriers to Bob through an appropriate, au-
thenticated quantum channel. Eve intercepts each carrier
in transmission and keeps an imperfect copy, obtained by
operating a quantum-cloning machine, before forwarding
the carrier to Bob. The quest is then for the best cloning
machine — best for this purpose — in conjunction with
the best way of extracting information from the clones.
The other scenario is that of the 1991 protocol by Ek-
ert (E91, [3]), in which a source distributes entangled
pairs of carriers to Alice and Bob, who make statistically
independent measurements on them, thereby effectively
establishing a quantum channel between themselves. Eve
is given full control of the source. She keeps a quantum
record of what is sent in the form of auxiliary quantum
systems, usually termed ancillas, that she entangles with
the paired carriers. Here the quest is for the best ancilla
states in conjunction with the best way of extracting in-
formation from the ancillas.
In lack of superior alternatives, the standard analy-
sis of protocols of BB84 type invokes unproven assump-
tions about optimal cloning machines; see, for example,
Refs. [4, 5] and the recent paper by Ac´ın et al. [6]. Like-
wise, there is a common assumption in the analysis of
E91-type protocols, namely that the so-called square-root
measurement (SRM, [7]) is optimal for Eve’s processing
of the ancillas; see the recent paper by Liang et al. [8],
for example. The established equivalence of the BB84
and E91 scenarios [9], and the fully equivalent security
criteria thus found, is strong circumstantial evidence that
these assumptions — about Eve’s best intercept strategy
and her best way of processing the ancillas, respectively
— are equivalent as well.
It is the objective of this article to demonstrate that
the SRM is not optimal for a whole class of quantum
cryptography protocols, the tomographic protocols of
Refs. [8, 10]; it may very well not be optimal for other
protocols, too. The equivalence stated above then implies
the well-founded conjecture that there are also better in-
tercept strategies than those usually regarded as best.
We offer some remarks about the connection of this work
with intercept strategies in the Appendix.
II. THE PYRAMID OF ANCILLA STATES
We build on the work of Ref. [8], where the protocols
are phrased as generalizations of the E91 scenario to N
letter alphabets (N = 2, 3, . . .), The source controlled
by Eve would emit pairs of qubits for N = 2, pairs of
qutrits for N = 3, . . . , pairs of qunits in the general
case. After everything is done and said, Eve knows that
her ancilla is in the state described by ket
∣∣Ek〉 if Alice
obtains value k for her qunit of the respective pair (with
k = 0, 1, . . . , N−1). Since there is a common (real) angle
between every pair of ancilla states,
〈
Ek
∣∣El〉 = λ+ (1− λ)δkl =
{
1 if k = l
λ if k 6= l
}
= r0 − r1 +Nr1δkl , (1)
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FIG. 1: Pyramid geometry for N = 3. The ancilla kets
∣∣Ek〉,
of unit length, are the edges of the ancilla pyramid. Its shape
is determined by the parameter λ of (1), the cosine of the
acute angle between any pair of edges. The height ket
∣∣H〉
of (2) points from the tip of the pyramid to the center of
its base; its length is
√
r0. The kets
∣∣Ek〉 − ∣∣H〉, of length√
1− r0, point from the center of the pyramid base to its
corners. The SRM kets
∣∣ek〉 of (9), of unit length, define
the SRM pyramid, which has right angles between its edge
kets. The SRM pyramid is wider than, but not as high as,
the ancilla pyramid.
the N ancilla kets can be regarded as the edges of an N -
dimensional pyramid [11]; see Fig. 1 for an illustration of
the case of N = 3. The average ancilla ket
∣∣H〉 = 1
N
N−1∑
k=0
∣∣Ek〉 (2)
points from the tip of the pyramid to the center of its
(N − 1)-dimensional base [12], so that the length of
∣∣H〉,√〈
H
∣∣H〉 = √r0 , is the height of the pyramid. The pyra-
mid volume is given by (1/N !)(Nr0)
1/2(Nr1)
(N−1)/2, it
is largest for λ = 0, r0 = r1 = 1/N when the pyramid is
a corner of a N -dimensional cube.
Geometry restricts λ to the range −1/(N−1) ≤ λ ≤ 1,
where both limits correspond to degenerate pyramids
that have no N -dimensional volume. For λ = 1, we
have a single ancilla state and the pyramid is just a
line, a pyramid of unit height and no base; and for
λ = −1/(N − 1) we have linearly dependent ancilla kets
that span an (N − 1)-dimensional subspace, so that the
pyramid has no height. In the context of quantum cryp-
tography, however, only nonnegative λ values are rele-
vant, for which r0 ≥ r1. In other words, the pyramids of
interest are acute, in the sense that the common angle
between each pair of their edges is acute.
Alice gets each k value with probability 1/N , so that
ρ =
1
N
N−1∑
k=0
∣∣Ek〉〈Ek∣∣ (3)
is the statistical operator for Eve’s ancillas. The height
ket
∣∣H〉 of (2) is eigenket of ρ to eigenvalue r0 and all
kets orthogonal to
∣∣H〉 are eigenkets to the (N − 1)-fold
degenerate eigenvalue r1 = r0 − λ = (1 − λ)/N .
The N kets
∣∣Ek〉 − ∣∣H〉, each of length √1− r0 =√
(N − 1)r1, point from the center of the ancilla-pyramid
base to its corners. They span the (N − 1)-dimensional
subspace to eigenvalue r1.
III. WHICH EDGE OF THE PYRAMID?
A. The pretty good square-root measurement
Eve extracts information out of ρ with the aid of a gen-
eralized measurement, a positive-operator-valued mea-
sure (POVM), specified by a decomposition of the iden-
tity in the N -dimensional ancilla space into M nonnega-
tive operators,
1 =
M−1∑
m=0
Pm , Pm ≥ 0 . (4)
The mutual information between Alice and Eve,
I =
N−1∑
n=0
M−1∑
m=0
pnm logN
pnm
pn·p·m
, (5)
is then computable from the joint probabilities
pnm =
1
N
〈
En
∣∣Pm∣∣En〉 (6)
and their marginals
pn· =
M−1∑
m=0
pnm =
1
N
, p·m =
N−1∑
n=0
pnm . (7)
For convenient normalization, the logarithm in (5) is
taken to base N , so that I ≤ 1 with the maximum
achieved for uniform perfect correlations, that is for
M = N and pnm = δnm/N .
The POVM for the SRM is specified by settingM = N
and
Pm = (Nρ)
−1/2
∣∣Em〉〈Em∣∣(Nρ)−1/2 ≡ ∣∣em〉〈em∣∣ (8)
with ∣∣em〉 = (∣∣Em〉− ∣∣H〉) 1√
Nr1
+
∣∣H〉 1√
Nr0
. (9)
The resulting joint probabilities are
pnm =
1
N
∣∣〈En∣∣em〉∣∣2 = 1
N
[
η1 + (η0 − η1)δnm
]
, (10)
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FIG. 2: Mutual information between Alice and Eve if Eve
performs the square-root measurement. The curves refer to
N = 2, 3, 5, 10, 20, and 100, and the plot covers the range
0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 that is relevant for quantum cryptography.
where
√
η0 −√η1 =
√
Nr1 and η0 + (N − 1)η1 = 1 . (11)
We note that the SRM thus associated with the ancilla
pyramid happens to be a standard von Neumann mea-
surement, not a POVM proper, because the projectors
in (8) are pairwise orthogonal, tr {PmPm′} = δmm′ . The
mutual information acquired by performing the SRM,
I(SRM) = η0 logN (Nη0) + (N − 1)η1 logN (Nη1) , (12)
is shown in Fig. 2 for N = 2, 3, 5, 10, 20, 100.
B. Better than pretty good
Whereas the SRM is known to be “pretty good” as
a rule [13], it is also known that it does not always op-
timize the mutual information. In particular, Shor has
pointed out that there are superior POVMs for N = 3
and some λ < 0, and has conjectured that there is also
a λ > 0 range in which other POVMs could be better
[14]. Shor’s explicit example for λ < 0 is interesting in
its own right but does not seem to have any bearing on
the security analysis of quantum-cryptography protocols.
By contrast, the λ > 0 examples reported below, are of
immediate relevance, as they invalidate, at least partly,
established security criteria.
Consider the one-parametric family of POVMs defined
by M = N + 1 and Pm =
∣∣e¯m〉〈e¯m∣∣ with
m < N :
∣∣e¯m〉 = (∣∣Em〉− ∣∣H〉) 1√
Nr1
+
∣∣H〉 t√
Nr0
,
m = N :
∣∣e¯N〉 = ∣∣H〉
√
1− t2
r0
, (13)
where 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. The SRM kets of (9) obtain for t = 1.
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FIG. 3: Mutual information for the POVM of (13) relative
to that of the SRM. For N = 10, the plot shows the ratio
of I(T )/I(SRM) as a function of T for λ = 0.9, 0.7, 0.5, 0.3
(solid lines) and for λ = 0.8, 0.6, 0.4 (dashed lines). The left
end (T = 0) refers to the SRM, the right end (T = 1) to the
MUD. For λ = 0.77276 (dash-dotted line), both give the same
mutual information.
For t < 1, the measurement pyramid, which has the
kets
∣∣e¯0〉, . . . ,∣∣e¯N−1〉 for its edges, has the same base
area as the SRM pyramid, but is of smaller height and
therefore obtuse. Since the angle between any such given∣∣e¯m〉 and the ancilla kets ∣∣En〉 with n 6= m increases as
t decreases from t = 1, the sector of m < N will have
increased mutual information. But this comes at a price:
When Eve finds
∣∣e¯N〉 ∝ ∣∣H〉 she has no clue about Alice’s
value; the sector m = N is inconclusive and provides no
contribution at all to the mutual information. Accord-
ingly, the optimal choice of t is such that the increase
of mutual information in the m < N sector is balanced
against the increase in the probability of the inconclusive
result; this probability equals (1 − t2)r0.
For t =
√
r1/r0, the POVM specified by (13) is the
“measurement for unambiguous discrimination” (MUD,
[7]), for which
〈
En
∣∣e¯m〉 = 0 if n 6= m < N , so that
there are perfect correlations, and thus full mutual in-
formation, in the m < N sector. The cost for this per-
fection is, however, so high that the MUD never max-
imizes the mutual information, although it can outper-
form the SRM. The optimal choice for t is always in the
range
√
r1/r0 < t ≤ 1. This observation is illustrated
in Fig. 3 for N = 10 and various values of λ, includ-
ing λ = 0.77276, for which the MUD and the SRM give
the same mutual information. The plot shows only the t
range of interest, conveniently re-parameterized in terms
of T , a scaled version of t, introduced in accordance with
t = 1− T + T
√
r1/r0 . (14)
Thus, T = 0 refers to the SRM, and T = 1 to the MUD.
The mutual information for the POVMs specified by
(13) is given by
I(T ) = η¯0 logN
Nη¯0
η¯0 + (N − 1)η¯1
41.0
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FIG. 4: Ratio of the maximal mutual information Imax and
the SRM value I(SRM), for N = 3, 5, 10, 20, 100, as a function
of λ.
+(N − 1)η¯1 logN
Nη¯1
η¯0 + (N − 1)η¯1 , (15)
where
η¯0 =
(√
η0 − T√η1
)2
, η¯1 = (1− T )2η1 (16)
are the T dependent versions of η0, η1. For ancilla pyra-
mids with a large volume, 0 < λ < (3−4/N)/(N−1) ≡ Λ,
the maximum of I(T ) obtains for T = 0, which is to say
that the SRM is optimal in this range of small λ values.
By contrast, for ancilla pyramids with a rather small vol-
ume, Λ < λ < 1, the maximum of I(T ) is reached for
T = 1 − (
√
η0/η1 − 1)/(N − 2), that is when the ar-
guments of the two logarithms in (15) equal N − 1 and
1/(N−1), respectively. Then, the measurement pyramid
is obtuse.
In summary we have
Imax ≡ max
T
I(T ) (17)
=


I(SRM) of (12) if 0 ≤ λ ≤ Λ = 3N − 4
N(N − 1) ,
(1− λ)N − 1
N − 2 logN (N − 1) if Λ ≤ λ ≤ 1.
This is our central result.
For λ values that exceed the threshold value of Λ sub-
stantially, the optimal POVM from the family (13) gives
significantly more mutual information than the SRM.
This can be seen by plotting the ratio Imax/I
(SRM) as
a function of λ; see Fig. 4. The λ→ 1 limit,
Imax
I(SRM)
→ N/2
N − 2 ln(N − 1) as λ→ 1, (18)
shows that the optimal POVM provides much more in-
formation than the SRM if N is large, and then the range
0 ≤ λ < Λ ≃ 3/N is small in addition.
IV. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
In summary, there are POVMs that outperform the
SRM for λ > Λ, and we know the optimal POVM of the
sort defined by (13) quite explicitly. We are, in fact, quite
sure that it is the global optimum because an extensive
numerical search failed to find any better POVM.
A first search covered a large class of POVMs that re-
spect the geometry of the ancilla pyramid: We took pa-
rameter t to be complex; we rotated around the symme-
try axis specified by ket
∣∣H〉; and we considered weighted
sums of several such POVMs, with different t parame-
ters and different rotations. For all of the many N and
λ values, for which the numerical investigation was per-
formed, the optimal POVM was always of the kind de-
scribed above.
A second search, not restricted by geometrical or other
constraints, confirmed these findings. It used the numeri-
cal method of Ref. [15], which is a fix-point iteration that
converges monotonically toward the optimal POVM.
We note further that the large relative difference shown
in Fig. 4 occurs where both Imax and I
(SRM) are small,
and so the absolute difference is rather small (see the
figure in Ref. [16]). Therefore, the SRM threshold values
given in Table I of Ref. [8] are quite good approximations
for the true threshold values, as shown by the numerical
values in Table I.
The “disturbance” values listed in this table are the
quantities denoted by Dindd+1 in Ref. [5] and by 1 − β0 in
Ref. [8], respectively. There is no difference for N = 2, of
course, but for all N > 2 the true threshold is noticeably
lower than the SRM threshold. In addition to this shift
of the threshold, there is also a reduced efficiency inside
the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner regime (below the threshold) and this
must be taken into account when extracting the secure
key sequence from the noisy raw data. Fortunately, how-
TABLE I: Threshold values for the disturbance below which
the Csisza´r–Ko¨rner theorem ensures that a secure key can
be extracted from the noisy raw data. The second column
gives the critical disturbance, that is (N−2)2/[(N −2)2+N ],
above which the SRM is optimal, as implied by Eq. (17). The
third column repeats the values of Refs. [5] and [8], where
Eve extracts information with the aid of the SRM. The true
threshold values of the fourth column obtain for the optimal
POVM.
Critical Csisza´r–Ko¨rner thresholds
N value SRM true
2 0.0% 15.6373% 15.6373%
3 25.0% 22.6714% 22.6707%
4 50.0% 26.6561% 26.5989%
5 64.3% 29.2303% 29.1038%
10 86.5% 34.9713% 34.7051%
30 96.3% 39.8403% 39.6259%
50 97.9% 41.1886% 41.0284%
100 99.0% 42.5282% 42.4295%
∞ 100.0% 50.0000% 50.0000%
5ever, almost all of the practical quantum cryptography
scheme presently implemented use qubits (N = 2), and
then the SRM is optimal. Also, the optimal POVMs have
no bearing on the threshold for classical advantage dis-
tillation [6, 10], because the SRM remains optimal in the
relevant limit, even for coherent eavesdropping attacks
[17].
In the spirit of Shor’s investigation of obtuse pyra-
mids, the eavesdropping procedure presented here can be
viewed as a quantum communication channel, in which
Alice transmits nonorthogonal and equally distributed
signal states to Eve. The amount of information about
the sequence of states sent by Alice, maximized over all
possible POVMs, is then the accessible information of
this quantum channel. Therefore, the maximal mutual
information (17) between Alice and Eve gives us also this
accessible information for 0 ≤ λ, which supplements, for
N = 3, Shor’s λ < 0 result.
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APPENDIX: INTERCEPT ATTACKS
Here are a few remarks about the connection with in-
tercept attacks on qunits sent through an authenticated
quantum channel. We make use of the notational con-
ventions of Ref. [8] without explaining them anew, and
refer to Eq. (12), say, of Ref. [8] by ([8]-12).
The geometry of the unnormalized ancilla states∣∣E˜(m)kl 〉 is completely determined, for a given m value, by
the inner products of Eq. ([8]-6), and Eq. ([8]-7) states
the transformation law between ancilla states to different
m values. It follows from this equation that the k index
of
∣∣E˜(m)kl 〉 is analogous to that in ∣∣mk〉, and the l index
to that in
∣∣ml〉. Therefore, it is expedient to regard the∣∣E˜(m)kl 〉’s as the kets of two-qunit states that are super-
positions of basis kets of the
∣∣mkml〉 kind. They then
acquire the strikingly simple explicit form
∣∣E˜(m)kl 〉 = ∣∣ψ〉δkl a√
N
+
∣∣mkml〉 b
N
, (A.1)
where
∣∣ψ〉 = 1√
N
∑
k
∣∣mkmk〉 (any m value) (A.2)
is the maximally entangled state that is conjugate to
∣∣ψ〉
of Eq. ([8]-2). This ansatz for
∣∣E˜(m)kl 〉 is consistent with
Eq. ([8]-6) if the complex amplitudes a, b obey
∣∣∣a+ 1
N
b
∣∣∣2 = β0 − N − 1
N
β1 ,
∣∣b∣∣2 = Nβ1 , (A.3)
but no other restrictions apply, so that a =
√
β0 − β1,
b = i
√
Nβ1 is a permissible choice.
The entangled pure state
∣∣Ψ〉 of Eq. ([8]-5) that is pre-
pared by Eve is then of the compact form∣∣Ψ〉 = ∣∣ψ12ψ34〉a+ ∣∣ψ13ψ24〉b , (A.4)
where qunit 1 is sent to Alice, qunit 2 is sent to Bob,
and qunits 3 and 4 make up Eve’s ancilla. We note that
this is the generic form of
∣∣Ψ〉 because all alternatives
are obtained from this
∣∣Ψ〉 by unitary transformations
on the ancilla.
Now, the “asymmetric universal quantum cloning ma-
chines” [18], generalizations of the symmetric ones intro-
duced by Buzˇek and Hillery [19], that are employed in
Refs. [4, 5] for the analysis of intercept attacks on the
qunit in transmission from Alice to Bob, are character-
ized by a four-qunit state of the form (A.4). The resulting
states of the clone-anticlone pair are thus fully analogous
to the ancilla states
∣∣E˜(m)kl 〉 in (A.1). Of those, the ones
with k 6= l are orthogonal among themselves and orthogo-
nal to those with k = l, and the latter form the pyramid
of ancilla states described in Sec. II. Accordingly, Eve
can extract more information if she applies the optimal
POVM of Sec. III B to the clone-anticlone pair, rather
than submitting them to the usual SRM.
[1] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 24,
339 (1978).
[2] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in IEEE Conference on
Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing, Bangalore,
India (IEEE, New York, 1984), p. 175.
[3] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[4] M. Bourennane, A. Karlsson, G. Bjo¨rk, N. Gisin, N. J.
Cerf, J. Phys. A 35, 10065 (2002).
[5] N. J. Cerf, M. Bourennane, A. Karlsson, N. Gisin, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 88, 127902 (2002).
[6] A. Ac´ın, N. Gisin, and V. Scarani, Quant. Inf. Comp. 3,
563 (2003).
[7] See, e.g., the review article by A. Chefles, Contemp.
Phys. 41, 401 (2000), and the pertinent references
therein.
[8] Y. C. Liang, D. Kaszlikowski, B.-G. Englert, L. C. Kwek,
C. H. Oh, Phys. Rev. A 68, 022324 (2003).
[9] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, and N. D. Mermin Phys.
Rev. Lett. 68, 557 (1992).
[10] D. Bruß, M. Christandl, A. Ekert, B.-G. Englert, D. Kas-
6zlikowski, C. Macchiavello, Phys. Rev. Lett. 91, 097901
(2003).
[11] PutN → n,
∣∣Ek〉→ ∣∣Ekk〉, and λ→ 1−β1/β0 to convert
to the notational conventions of Ref. [8]. Other symbols,
in particular r0, r1 and η0, η1, have the same significance.
[12] Geometrically speaking, the base of the N-dimensional
pyramid is itself an (N − 1)-dimensional pyramid with
edges of length
√
2Nr1 and an angle of 60
◦ between them.
[13] P. Hausladen and W. K. Wootters, J. Mod. Opt. 41, 2385
(1994).
[14] P. W. Shor, IBM Journal of Research and Development
48, 115 (2004).
[15] J. Rˇeha´cˇek, B.-G. Englert, and D. Kaszlikowski, e-print
quant-ph/0408134.
[16] D. Kaszlikowski, A. Gopinathan, Y. C. Liang, L. C.
Kwek, B.-G. Englert, e-print quant-ph/0307086.
[17] D. Kaszlikowski, J. Y. Lim, L. C. Kwek, B.-G. Englert,
e-print quant-ph/0312172.
[18] N. J. Cerf, Acta Phys. Slov. 48, 115 (1998); J. Mod. Opt.
47, 187 (2000); Phys. Rev. Lett. 84, 4497 (2000).
[19] V. Buzˇek and M. Hillery, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 5003
(1998).
